From tracking relations to propositional attitudes by Adam Morton
We often take propositional atti-tudes, such as “believes”, “wants”, 
“remembers”, as characteristic of folk 
psychology, the way humans understand 
other humans. This can seem mysteri-
ous, since we express propositional at-
titudes as if they were relations between 
individuals and propositions, and such 
relations are not common in our descrip-
tions of non-mental reality. (Churchland 
1981, in giving reasons to be suspicious 
of folk psychology, lists this peculiar 
propositional ontology as a prime rea-
son. See also Morton 2009.) In this pa-
per I argue that this is wrong. Concepts 
of propositional attitudes are not the sui 
generis and essential element in folk psy-
chology. Propositional attitude language 
is not the core of our everyday descrip-
tion of mind. Rather, this language can 
be seen as a way of describing some-
thing less exotic. So, on the picture I shall 
sketch, there are facts that are easily seen 
to be real relations between living organ-
isms and their environments, which can 
be described in the same language as ev-
erything else. Then the language can be 
given just a little tweak, and we get a new 





 I explore the possibility that propositional at-
titudes are not basic in folk psychology, and 
that what we really ascribe to people are rela-
tions to individuals, those that the apparently 
propositional contents of beliefs, desires, and 
other states concern. In particular, the relation 
between a state and the individuals that it tracks 
shows how ascription of propositional attitudes 
could grow out of ascription of relations be-
tween people and objects.
Key words: propositional attitudes, psychologi-
cal relations, content
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way of speaking, with the appearance of describing something very different. Proposi-
tional attitude talk is thus almost a linguistic convenience, building on our unremark-
able descriptions of the world and its inhabitants in terms of relations between them. 
2. Psychological relations, propositional attitudes 
Begin by noting how we rely on relations between individuals and objects in their en-
vironment when we describe actions and motives: a is looking at o, a is running away 
from o, a finds o. Many such relations are easily learned by young humans, and by 
many other animals too. Our sensitivity to the objects of attention of others helps us 
here (see Tomasello 2008, Morton 2002.) I take it that these relations while not exactly 
definable in physics, are as clear as most of the concepts we use. They are also in a basic 
way intentional: they concern ways in which a mind is directed at an object. We often 
assimilate these to a sophisticated level of thinking in terms of beliefs and desires, but 
it is worth bearing in mind that very small children and intelligent animals who do not 
have the concepts of belief and desire, can represent individuals watching or following. 
(An animal on the edge of a herd notices nearby predators but does not react to them. 
Then one of the predators begins to stalk the animal, which immediately rejoins the 
herd. Or a predator is stalking a prey animal. The prey animal notices the predator, and 
the predator immediately switches from stalking to attacking. The important relation 
for the prey animal is “it is watching me”, and the important relation for the predator is 
“it has noticed me watching it.”) 
At the level of human language-based descriptions such relations are hard to separate 
from ascriptions of belief and desire. As many have pointed out, often what seems a 
simple relation between a person and an object in fact involves a proposition. Szofia 
wants an apple; we assume that she wants to eat it, but she may want to paint it or 
feed it to her cat, so to be really explicit we should say “Zsofia wants to eat an apple” 
or “Zsofia wants to feed an apple to her cat”. Even then there is an ambiguity; Szofia 
may want to eat a particular apple - some apple is such that Zsofia wants to eat it - or 
perhaps any apple will do - Szofia wants that there be an apple that she eats. Attitudes 
to non-existents are now possible. Zsofia may want the apple of eternal youth; in full 
content she wants that there be an apple of eternal youth that she has. These points 
are implicit in Brentano and familiar to readers of Quine. For my purposes I need 
only that everyday psychology becomes much richer, but also more puzzling, when 
we move from simple relations towards objects of thought to propositional attitudes. 
(Bertrand Russell had an account of propositional attitudes that is in some ways simi-
lar. See chapter 12 of Russell 1912. Thanks to Ori Simchen for pointing this out.) 
My question is how we get from one to the other. I shall describe a possible route. It is 
not meant as evolutionary psychology. I am not claiming that this is how we came to 
understand propositional attitudes, though it might throw some light on how we actu-
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ally did it. The main object is the semantic rather than the historical connection: how 
thoughts with one structure characterise facts with another. This may also give useful 
information about how to think in cases where propositional attitudes do not fit well.
2. Tracking
The starting point is a large range of relations between individual thinkers and objects 
of thought. It includes concepts of emotion inasmuch as they can be taken in a rela-
tional way: Toby is afraid of that spider. It also includes perception verbs: Toby sees 
that spider. It does not include propositional attitudes. It is remarkable, though, how in 
everyday language we obscure the issue of whether we are describing a relation or an 
attitude. We say “Zsofia sees the apple at the end of the branch” . Does she see that it is 
at the end of the branch? That is not literally asserted, but most hearers would take that 
as part of what is said, unless the presupposition is explicitly denied. (I think “presup-
position” is the right word here, so as a general point many perceptual and cognitive 
relational verbs presuppose but do not entail their propositional variants.) 
This can happen with thought as well as perception. We say “Zsofia wants the apple at 
the end of the branch” and the hearer assumes, unless warned otherwise, that Zsofia 
knows that is where the apple is. “Zsofia wants the apple, which will go well with the 
cheese in her bag” is naturally, though not inevitably, taken to communicate that she 
wants to eat it with the cheese. (Novelists use the device of describing from a point of 
view as a way of not encumbering the reader with too many explicit attitude embed-
dings.) It is striking how many propositional attitudes are linked to simple relations 
between people and things. While Toby may be afraid that the spider will jump on his 
head, he may also simply fear the spider. Zsofia may know or believe that the apple is 
on the bough, but she can also see the apple. Zsofia may want to eat the apple, but she 
can also hunger for it.
I am particularly interested in what one might call information-management relations, 
of which the central cases arise when someone tracks some property of an object, or 
keeps track of some information about it. These need not appeal to any complicated 
theory.  Though we say “Toby is tracking the spider” with reference to epistemology or 
cognitive science, we can more informally say “Toby is watching the spider”, “Toby is 
keeping tabs on the spider”, “Toby is keeping track of where the spider is”. Indeed when 
in a non-specialist context we talk of tracking we mean actions one animal performs 
towards another, particularly hunting actions of following a visual or scent trail. So it 
is curious that in philosophy we use the term primarily for the epistemic relation of 
maintaining information in a way that is sensitive to changes in an object. The term 
comes from Robert Nozick, and is a metaphor derived from the operations of, for ex-
ample, a radar system in keeping track of the location of an airplane. (See Nozick 1981 
but also Dretske 1970, and obliquely but in generality Morton 1975. For a recent treat-
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ment see Roush 2005.) Of course in doing this a radar system may have to perform 
physical actions that are like those of a hunting animal, notably in turning its antenna 
in the direction of the plane. Our sophisticated concepts of these things tend to in-
clude a propositional attitude component, but I am assuming that we can have simpler 
concepts which simply describe a relation between the person and the object. The an-
telope and the lion each keep track of where the other is. 
Suppose that one animal is visually tracking another. We can express this just as “a 
is tracking o”. This is a two-place relation. But it suggests a three place relation. This 
is crucial to what I am saying, so I shall proceed carefully. The important fact about 
tracking is that it alludes to a counterfactual connection between the location of the 
tracked object and the subject’s actual or possible reactions to its location.  If the object 
had been elsewhere (within a near range) then the subject would have taken it to be 
elsewhere. The concept of representing an object as being at a location is too sophis-
ticated to attribute to basic psychologizers, but concepts that are linked to it, such as 
that of finding, are more accessible. Suppose that the object can be or move to three 
locations. We can assert
if o is at l1 then a will find it at l1 & if o is at l2 then a will find it at l2 & if o is at l3 
then a will find it at l3
Of course there may be infinitely many possible locations and we may say things like
wherever o is in R, a will find it
These conditionals have counterfactual force. o may not stray into R so that a does not 
in fact find it, but we can still say that if it had so strayed it would have been found. And 
if o is in R and is found then we have a low-level causal explanation of why a found 
it. a found it because a has the capacity to find things like o in R. Instead of “find” we 
could use a number of other actions: “catch”, “see”, “point to”, “touch” and others. This 
is a basic contingent fact about the psychology of many mammals: the ability to locate 
an object in a way that guides one kind of action can often guide other kinds of action. 
(And so too with other kinds of tracking and classification, as will become important.) 
As a result, there is a general category of actions, which we can call locating, or indicat-
ing where. We can say of an agent that it locates an object, meaning that it is placed to 
catch it or find it or point at it. 
When an agent can locate an object it can locate the place where the object is. You can 
be looking for something and an informant can show you the place, which you can 
identify before you can find the object. (Or they can show you, perhaps pointing to a 
track, the place where it was yesterday.) You can then locate doubly, the object and its 
location.  You can imagine this as pointing at the object and at a map, but that is just a 
metaphor for the reality of representing the object as being at a location and represent-
ing the location as being where it is in relation to other locations. So we have a three 
termed relation “a locates o at l”. But to understand that this relation holds is to under-
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stand that a knows that o is at l. We have made a basic connection between tracking 
relations and propositional attitudes. 
This may seem to trade on special features of the attribute of location. But the same 
idea works for many other attributes too. We can point to features besides locations, 
for example to colours and species. One can imagine this with a colour chart or a bird-
identification table. As an object changes colour in the setting sun, or as different birds 
appear at the feeder a person points to the appropriate colour or species. (Of course 
the pointing might also be by calling out the name of the colour or species, but I am 
temporarily keeping language out of the picture.) And one might point to both the 
object and the feature, indicating the bird with one hand and its colour or species with 
the other. Most often these pointings are done in thought, and one might describe the 
“two-handed” pointing as “a identified o as a towhee”. It is important here that the spe-
cies or colour identification share the capacity of location identification to support a 
variety of actions. It does: if Toby is keeping track of what species the creatures around 
him are then he will become fearful if he takes one to be a spider, adopting anti-spider 
measures rather than anti-lion measures; he will become aggressive if he takes one to 
be a hunt-able source of food; he will become curious if he takes one to be an interest-
ing bird. And, a closely related point, he can both point to that particular spider and 
point to all the spiders nearby, thus both identifying the spider as a spider and identi-
fying the species as a species. So the two place relation “a is aware of the species of o” 
can be expanded to a three place relation “a identifies o as being of species s”.
It is characteristic of tracking relations that they relate the individual subject both to 
the object of their attention and to the attribute that they are attending to. This is a 
consequence of their counterfactual force. If a is tracking o’s location then a would be 
disposed to react differently if o were at a different location. So the connection is sensi-
tive to the location: it is a relation to that as well as to the object, and more of its causal 
explanatory force is brought out when this third term is made explicit. And generally, 
when there is a counterfactual connection, when, that is, the implications for what can 
be expected of a depend on which value v in a range of values applies to a, we have a 
relation of explanatorily useful three termed relation between a, o, and v. 
Once we have such three termed relations we are clearly on the edge of propositional 
attitudes. To identify the bird as a towhee is to know that it is a towhee. “a knows that o 
is of species s” is a convenient way of saying “a identifies o as being of species s”. To put 
it generally “a attitudes that o is P” is a convenient way of saying that a’s identification 
of o as having property P plays a particular role in a’s psychology”. 
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3. Substantiality
The approach can be applied to a range of attitudes and a range of properties. It is im-
portant to see that the analysis is not trivial and, related though it seems an opposite 
worry, is not asking the impossible. It might seem trivial because “a attitudes that o is 
P” is obviously equivalent to a three-place relation A(a, o, P) between a person, an indi-
vidual, and a property. For every attitude there is such a relation. But the tracking-based 
analysis I have given does not proceed directly through these relations, and as a result 
will not work automatically for any A, a, o, and P. They are not plausible candidates for 
our purposes because it is hard to see how people who did not yet attribute propositional 
attitudes could have any sense of them. That is the danger of triviality. (Another way of 
putting non-triviality: if for every property P we consider a 2-place relation “a attitudes 
o with respect to P” then we are replacing a single attitude with infinitely many relations. 
What is needed is the 3-place relation between a, o, and P; but that is not something a 
person can grasp without some way of separately identifying o, P, and the way they are 
linked.)  Instead of doing it this way, I am postulating a family of tracking relations, each 
tied to a specific family of attributes of objects (being in location l1, location l2, …, being a 
robin, or an eagle, or a penguin,… .) Each relation has explanatory value in a straightfor-
ward way, so that it would be natural and valuable for individuals to conceive of others in 
terms of them. One need not even take the third argument place to range over abstract 
things. There is a relation “a points to o1 as having the colour of o2” where we are using 
objects in the o2 place as examples indexing the colours. The result is that we can suppose 
that there are conceptually accessible and explanatorily useful three place relations for a 
fair number of classes of attributes: species, locations, colours and other limited families. 
Such relations are available, and in fact familiar, whenever we can easily understood as 
keeping track of where in the range of the family an object is. 
I am relating subtle and conceptually sophisticated things, propositional attitudes, to 
simpler things, tracking relations, whose attributions have similar consequences in 
terms of explaining behaviour. So tracking relations can do much of the same work, 
and can be thought of as possible precursors of the attitudes. But there is no claim that 
any of these things can be defined in terms of the behaviour that they can be used to 
explain. The project is not behaviouristic. The various tracking relations can be subtle 
and hard to learn. Our grasp of them may depend on our innate human capacities to 
anticipate one another. It may depend on our taking part in various practices and on 
our having being taught various doctrines. It may depend on our having undergone 
long processes of training and correction by others who have grasped them. Or, in 
some cases, it may depend on none of these. The point is not the kind of conceptual 
simplicity that goes with reduction to an easily observed or theory-independent basis, 
but a different kind of conceptual simplicity that consists in reduction to facts whose 
logical form is the more accessible basis of attributes and relations. (There is a recent 
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psychological literature on spatial tracking and on our limits to keep track of a number 
of independently moving stimuli. See Bullot and Rysiew 2007, Pylyshyn 2007.) 
4. Towards false contents
The simplest examples of the process I have been describing presuppose that the in-
dividual does have the required property. So the attitude is factive: sees, finds, knows. 
But the analysis can be extended. For at the heart of our reductions of “a attitudes that 
o is P” are tracking relations between a and o and between a and P. It will often happen 
that a tracks o and a tracks P, although o is not P. 
Consider first the case of false belief. In basing propositional attitudes on relations be-
tween people and objects around them we make the primary sense of propositional at-
titudes also concern the ways people are in fact placed in their environments. There is 
some psychological evidence for this in the difficulty children have in acquiring the con-
cept of a false belief (see Perner 1991.) It is also in the spirit of recent work on the concept 
of belief. I am thinking first of “Millian” views that deny the Fregean intensionality of be-
lief (as in Salmon 1986, Braun 1998.) But I am also thinking of Williamson’s suggestion 
that the concept of knowledge is more basic and serves a greater explanatory function 
than that of belief, so that, as he puts it “belief is bungled knowledge” (Williamson 2000.).
Consider for example a situation like that of a classic false belief task in which a person 
has to point at an object which is, unbeknownst to her, seen through a refracting panel 
which shifts apparent locations several degrees to the right. The object is right in front 
of her, at the 90 degree point, but she points to the 85 degree point. The common-sense 
explanation is that that is where she thinks it is. And so for any spatial activity directed 
at the object - touching it, catching it, shining a light at it. They are all as if they were 
guided by a non-factive pointing at it, a pointing that need not be accurate. Suppose 
we take a non-factive relation of locating as “where the person would point or reach”. 
(Note the idioms “grasp at”, “look for”, non-factive variants on “grasp” and “see”.) Then 
when someone for example believes, perhaps falsely, that their phone is in their back-
pack, one relational core of the belief might be that they locate the backpack at some 
location, and locate the phone within that location. So the formula for “a believes that 
o bears spatial relation R to l” is  
a locates l and a locates o at l1 and l1 has R to l 
Again what we have is more factive than many belief-ascriptions. But again it reveals 
an indirect facticity that is in fact common in ascriptions of belief, and without which 
we would often not be able to make sense of them. The relation I have described can 
serve many of the explanatory functions of a belief that o is at a location bearing R to 
l. It can for example be central to an explanation of why a looked for o in l1, or why a 
went to l1 when she wanted o, or why a was surprised when o was not at l1. 
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We can do the same with other foci besides location. We can think of mentally point-
ing at a colour or at a species non-factively, an identification subject to an error, as in 
the spatial pointing discussed above.  
It is decidedly unclear for what range of beliefs this style of treatment gives a relational 
grounding. It is significant that the style is rather loose and varied. Different proposi-
tional attitudes and indeed different beliefs will be linked to a relational basis in differ-
ent ways. But it is important that it applies to a varied set of states, including a varied 
set of beliefs, and that some of them concern practically important topics. A natural 
suggestion would be that the precise import of a propositional content varies, depend-
ing on the sentence used to make the ascription and the explanatory purpose. 
Consider three further examples. First Toby’s fear of spiders. He is sitting down and a 
small spider is on the floor nearby. Toby is afraid of it, as shown by his nervous glances 
towards it. (Because of his fear he is tracking its location.) Things are ok as long as the 
spider stays where it is but if it runs up the wall Toby will be terrified. In fact, even 
now he is hastily putting his hat on and holding it down with his hands. His fear that 
the spider will land on his head is shown by his defending his head, and defending it 
against the spider. These are signs of a kind of tracking: Toby is keeping track of ap-
propriate responses to various spider threats and paying attention to those that are 
right for jumping-on-your-head threats. In fact the spider is completely harmless and 
to that extent this is not an appropriate response. What Toby is tracking is responses to 
threats of fearsome beasts, and for him the response to being jumped on from above 
is extremely vivid. A response is appropriate to a threat if taking it would prevent any 
harm if the threat happened. Actions motivated by fear that a beast will land on your 
head are actions which would prevent any harm if it did land on your head. Toby is 
ready to do such an action, which would prevent harm from the little spider landing 
on his head even though there is no chance of such harm. So our formula for “a (Toby) 
fears that o (the spider) may P (jump on his head)” is:
a identifies acts e such that if o were P & a performed e then a would not be hurt
Note two features of this formula. First, it is a kind of tracking. Toby tracks ways of 
preventing harm from spider assaults. If an act had had a different potentiality as spi-
der protection his attention to it would have been different. This is basic to fear: check-
ing out weak spots in the defences. This tracking is in its own way factive, the ways 
of evading the spider really are ways of evading the spider, even though they are un-
necessary. Second, it does not focus on the feeling of fear. It does focus on the cognitive 
and behavioural content of fear, namely, evading a threat, but it neglects the sense of 
terror or apprehension. And in fact the feeling and the escape-tracking are separable. 
You may know that you are afraid and be unaware that it is the spider that is making 
you nervous, let alone that your fear focuses on its landing on your head. 
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One might worry that we have described a consequence of fear, one that does center on a 
factive tracking, without having showed that this tracking is essential to fear itself. After 
all, many psychological states will cause some tracking activity, but to say that is not to 
make this activity central to them. That is a fair worry, but there is an element of mis-
understanding here. The claim is not that we can analyse “a fears that o is P” in tracking 
terms, but that when a fears there is usually some tracking activity that is tied to it. So 
then an observer might record the presence of this activity and use it as a predictor. and 
even in many cases as an explanation, of behaviour that we would explain in terms of 
fear. And surely when someone is afraid that something may do some harmful action 
they do typically keep track of ways of mitigating those possible effects. So we might 
then say “a is afraid of o. a is noticing ways of escaping.” Saying “a is afraid that o may 
do A” is a later development, though one that I mention again in the next section.
Next consider desire. Zsofia’s wants to eat the apple; she sees the apple and hungers for 
it. There are various ways available to her to get it. She can grasp it with her hands; she 
can stand on tiptoe and bite it; she can wait for it to fall; she can let her mother pluck it 
and her father bake it in a pie. She will do whatever is easy to get it into her mouth. So 
the formula for “a wants o to be P” is 
a identifies actions e such that if a performs e then o will be P 
Again there is a kind of tracking facticity. If circumstances had been different and ac-
tions had different powers to affect o’s being P, a would have paid different attention 
to them. And again it leaves out some of the intuitive force of the state. It leaves out a 
sense of wanting. And it simplifies, ignoring factors that come with competing desires. 
An important simplification involves a facticity: to want something to be the case, on 
this construal, is to identify actions that would actually achieve that result. But in fact 
people often succeed in performing actions to achieve their desires but do not succeed 
in getting what they want. (There is a similar complication in the treatment of fear 
above.) That is not a serious problem for our purposes, as the aim is to trace a route 
from relational psychological concepts to propositional attitudes. The attitudes we end 
up with are unlikely to be those found in folk psychology as it is actually now found. 
One way that the analysis of desire I have just given differs from the analysis of “know-
ing that o is P”, in the previous section, is that the tracking is not of o and P, but of 
means to o’s being P. o and P would themselves be tracked in some particular cases, 
though. Suppose that Zsofia wants to move the apple to a particular location, for ex-
ample her mouth. She will track the location of the apple and the location of the des-
tination, and will direct her push from the one towards the other until they coincide. 
The formula for “a wants (is trying to get) that o be at l” is
a locates o at l1 and identifies actions that move a towards l , and will cease to 
identify such actions when l1 = l.
16
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5. Preparing for the evolution
The target has been the facts rather than the language. My aim has been to describe 
a way in which relations between individuals and objects can acquire contents and 
explanatory roles which make it convenient to repackage them as propositional atti-
tudes. But there is obviously a linguistic/conceptual side too. We begin with a vocabu-
lary used for describing and explaining humans and their actions, which has relational 
terms but not propositional attitudes. Then we can progressively enrich the vocabulary 
of relations. We can include tracking concepts, and they can be rich and subtle, as 
in non-factive pointings to locations, colours, and other attributes. These are in effect 
names of cognitively basic classificatory processes. There are a potentially a large num-
ber of them. To name most of them one needs to mention an object and a property, 
or two properties, which can be hard to keep track of mentally, and hard to express 
linguistically. But we are supposing that all this is being done by human beings, whose 
languages are based on recursive embeddings of one sentence in another. So it is natu-
ral that they will adapt this device to describe such relational attitudes in terms of em-
bedded sentences. Instead of saying that a is tracking o at l, one says that a thinks that 
o is at l. Instead of saying that a non-factively location-tracks a direction as ahead and 
as being red, one says that a thinks that there is something red ahead. Instead of say-
ing that someone feels compelled to check all the ways of protecting his head against 
spider attack one says that he fears that the spider may leap on his head. To do this one 
has to introduce verbs such as “believes”, “knows”, “wants”, “fears that”. 
In terms of language, we are moving from a n-place relation to a 2-place relation be-
tween a person and a proposition which embeds a n-1 -place relation. There is nothing 
unusual about this. Consider the following.
“Zsofia kissed Toby in the park” can be expressed as “Zsofia kissed Toby when they 
were in the park”
“The bus hit the astronaut at the corner of Burrard and Cardero” can be expressed 
as “The bus hit the astronaut where Burrard meets Cardero”.
“They ambushed the convoy at the pass” can be expressed as “They ambushed the 
convoy when it got to the pass.”
“Toby painted the wall red” can be expressed as “Toby painted the wall so that it 
was red.”
(There are also connections with Donald Davidson’s treatment of action sentences in 
terms of events.) 
There are many constructions like this in English, using when, where, while, so that 
to reduce the number of argument places of a relation, in ways that are like the use 
of that to introduce the complement of a propositional attitude. Embedded sentence 
versions are not trivial variants on the relational versions, though. If we can say “Toby 
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painted the wall so that it was red” we can say “Toby painted the wall so that all people 
were free” or “Toby painted the wall so that there is life on Mars”. These may attribute 
implausble power to Toby, but they are grammatical and intelligible. Similarly, once 
we move from “Zsofia locates the apple at the end of the branch” to “Zsofia thinks 
the apple is at the end of the branch” we are in a position to say “Zsofia thinks that all 
people are free” and “Zsofia thinks that there is life on Mars”. And these say things that 
one cannot using the relational idiom. Once we have them we can add more assump-
tions and get the full sophisticated, and treacherous, concepts of non-factive emotion, 
belief, and desire. 
But this is my story. We start with factive relations between people and objects of 
thought, with respect to limited ranges of properties. These generate non-factive at-
titudinal relations between people, objects, and relations. The linguistic complexity of 
this pressures us to say, not “a relation o, P” but “a attitudes that o is P”. Then – no 
doubt aided by the usefulness of reporting what people have said or observed or are 
tending to produce in a general way - the attitudes have a life of their own. We attri-
bute attributes and can develop propositional attitude psychology. Voilà.
6. Post script: the superficiality of propositional attitudes
That is the end of my story, at any rate of the argued part. There is a post-script, though. 
Suppose not only that there is, as I have argued, a path from relations between people 
and the objects of their interest, particularly tracking relations, to propositional atti-
tudes, but that this is the path we humans actually took. That is speculation, of course, 
but it would have consequences. One is the likelihood that a lot of our thinking about 
other people, when we try to understand how they manage information about their 
environments and find means to their ends, occurs in relational rather than attitudinal 
terms. We use representations of tracking relations at an unconscious pre-linguistic 
level and in terms of them frame our expectations about what people will do. But these 
representations do not translate smoothly into propositional attitudes, so that think-
ing uniformly in terms of them is likely to be misleading. When we say that Toby fears 
that the spider may jump on his head the important fact may be his searching of ways 
of protecting his head, or his noticing where the spider is, or his searching for ways to 
escape. Which tracking relations to which objects are used in any particular case will 
be a delicate matter, not predictable in terms of the representation of our thoughts 
in terms of beliefs, desires, fears, and propositional knowledge. (Several philosophers, 
for example Stich 1983, have argued that cognition should be understood in terms of 
propositional attitudes more primitive than beliefs and desires. The suggestion here 
goes a step beyond this, with the idea that there is a definitely cognitive level of func-
tioning more basic than that of any relations to propositions at all.)
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The other radical consequence is that the interpretation of non-factive propositional 
attitudes is even more uncertain, related in a more indirect way to an even less definite 
basis of tracking relations. When we say that someone believes that their phone where 
their backpack used to be, we may be talking about their actual phone, an imaginary 
phone, the actual or a non-actual backpack, and we may be saying that the one is where 
the other actually was or some other location linked to it by some devious reasoning. 
There are many possibilities, and if we want to know what the person is actually think-
ing we may have to interpret it in terms of the way they track actual information from 
their actual surroundings.
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